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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Scot Winfield Casey appeals from the district court's order revoking
probation and executing his sentence of eight years with one and one-half years
determinate for felony DUI.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
Casey drove while under the influence of drugs.

(R., pp. 13-14.) The

state charged him with DUI, elevated to a felony because of a prior felony DUI
conviction less than six years previously.

(R., pp. 51-52.)

Casey pied guilty,

entering an Alford1 plea in exchange for the prosecution's agreement to
recommend that the court retain jurisdiction. (R., pp. 70-72.) The district court
sentenced Casey to a term of eight years with four years determinate and
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp. 83-85.)
Toward the end of the retained jurisdiction period the district court
suspended execution of the sentence and put Casey on probation. (R., pp. 8992.) Five months later Casey's probation officer filed an affidavit asserting Casey
violated his probation by drinking, consuming a controlled substance, disobeying
curfew, and "staying at an unknown residence." (R., pp. 93-95.) A few days later
the probation officer filed an addendum reporting that Casey violated probation
by altering his urinalysis to achieve a false urinalysis result, consuming alcohol,
failing to stay at his residence, using a controlled substance without a

North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (allowing guilty plea without
admission of factual guilt).
1

1

prescription, and not complying with the CAPP treatment program. (R., pp.98100.) Casey admitted some of the alleged violations and the district court found
the rest after a hearing. (R., pp. 112-13.) The district court revoked probation
and executed a reduced sentence of eight years with one and one-half years
determinate. (R., pp. 114-15.)
Six days after filing of the order revoking probation, Casey filed a motion
for reconsideration of the sentence. (R., p. 117.) The district court denied the
motion. (Augmentation.) Casey filed a notice of appeal timely from the order
revoking probation. (R., pp. 119-21.) In his notice of appeal he asked for the
standard transcript and a transcript of the "Probation Violation Hearing held on
December 13, 2011." (R., p. 120.) The court reporter lodged transcripts of the
December 13, 2011 probation violation hearing and the May 4, 2012 hearing on
the Rule 35 motion. (12/13/11 Tr.; 5/4/12 Tr.)
On appeal Casey moved to augment the record with transcripts of the
change of plea hearing, the sentencing hearing, and the "rider review" hearing.
(Motion to Augment.) The state objected. (Objection to "Motion to Augment.")
The Idaho Supreme Court denied the Motion to Augment.
Motion to Augment (July 30, 2012).)

2

(Order Denying

ISSUES
Casey states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Casey due process
and equal protection when it denied his Motion to Augment
with the requested transcripts?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr.
Casey's probation?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr.
Casey's Rule 35 motion requesting leniency?

(Appellant's brief, p. 4.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Casey failed to establish that he had a Constitutional right to the
requested transcripts?

2.

Has Casey failed to show any abuse of discretion in the district court's
order revoking probation and executing a reduced sentence of eight years
with one and one-half fixed for felony DUI?

3

ARGUMENT
I.
Casey Failed To Establish That He Had A Constitutional Right To The
Requested Transcripts
Introduction

A.

Casey argues that the Idaho Supreme Court violated his rights to due
process, equal protection, and effective assistance of counsel by denying his
motion for augmentation with transcripts of the October 10, 2010 change of plea
hearing, the November 22, 2010 sentencing hearing, and the May 17, 2011 "rider
review" hearing.

(Appellant's brief, pp. 5-17.)

Because Casey has failed to

establish that the transcripts are necessary for consideration of the issues raised
on appeal, Casey has failed to demonstrate any violation of his Constitutional
rights. 2

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of appellate review applicable to constitutional issues is one

of deference to factual findings, unless they are clearly erroneous, but free
review of whether constitutional requirements have been satisfied in light of the
facts found. State v. Bromgard, 139 Idaho 375, 380, 79 P.3d 734, 739 (Ct. App.
2003); State v. Smith, 135 Idaho 712, 720, 23 P.3d 786, 794 (Ct. App. 2001).

If this case is assigned to the Idaho Court of Appeals, it is without authority to
directly review, and find erroneous, a decision of the Idaho Supreme Court.
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _ , 288 P.3d 835,837 (Ct. App. 2012)
2
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C.

The Transcripts Are Not Necessary For Fair Consideration Of The Issues
On Appeal
A defendant in a criminal case has a due process right to "a record on

appeal that is sufficient for adequate appellate review of the errors alleged
regarding the proceedings below." State v. Strand, 137 Idaho 457, 462, 50 P.3d
472, 477 (2002) (citing Draper v. Washington, 372 U.S. 487 (1963); Lane v.
Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963); Eskridge v. Washington State Bd. Of Prison Terms
and Paroles, 357 U.S. 214 (1958); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956)); see also
State v. Morgan, 153 Idaho 618, _ , 288 P.3d 835, 838 (Ct. App. 2012). The
state, however, "will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily" to provide
transcripts that "will not be germane to consideration of the appeal." Draper, 372
U.S. at 495; see also M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 123 (1996) (indigent
appellant has right to "a transcript of relevant trial proceedings").

Rather, an

indigent defendant is entitled, at state expense, to only those transcripts and
portions of the record necessary to pursue the issues raised on appeal. Griffin,
351 U.S. 12; Lane, 372 U.S. 477.

"[T]he State must afford [the indigent

appellant] a record complete enough to allow fair appellate consideration of his
claims." S.L.J., 519 U.S. at 121. To demonstrate that the record is not sufficient,
the defendant must show that any omissions from the record prejudiced his
ability to pursue the appeal. See State v. Polson, 92 Idaho 615, 620-21, 448
P.2d 229, 234-35 (1968) (distinguishing Martinez v. State, 92 Idaho 148, 438
P.2d 893 (1968)). See also United States v. Smith, 292 F.3d 90, 93 (1st Cir.
2002).

5

This Court has appellate jurisdiction only to review the district court's order
revoking probation and imposing a reduced sentence and the order denying the
Rule 35 motion. (Compare I.AR. 14(a) (notice of appeal must be filed within 42
days of order challenged on appeal) with R., pp. 119 (notice of appeal filed 42
days after order revoking probation).) Casey has been afforded full transcripts of
the hearings that resulted in those orders. (12/13/11 Tr.; 5/4/12 Tr.) Transcripts
of the guilty plea hearing, the sentencing, and the rider review hearing are
unnecessary because this Court lacks appellate jurisdiction to review the orders
that issued from those respective hearings.

More importantly, transcripts of

those hearings were not prepared and were not presented to the district court in
relation to the probation violation proceedings and there is no indication that what
was said at those hearings played any role in the orders challenged on appeal.
The transcripts are simply unnecessary for appellate review of the only orders
within the scope of this Court's appellate jurisdiction.
Casey first asserts that without the denied transcripts the record will be
incomplete and his claims will not be reviewed on the merits. (Appellant's brief,
pp. 10-11.) He does not even posit how the transcripts are necessary, however.
(Id.) A naked statement that the transcripts are necessary is not proof that rights
were violated.
Casey next asserts that "a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained
from its own official position and observations" and therefore a defendant is
entitled to any transcript that might have contributed to the knowledge gained by
the judge. (Appellant's brief, pp. 11-12 (citing cases).) Accepting this reasoning

6

would, taken to its logical conclusion, entitle every criminal to a transcript of every
hearing ever presided over by the trial judge; a proposition unsupportable in the
law. In this case the record establishes that all of the evidence presented in the
hearings Casey wants transcribed is in the appellate record. The PSI and APSI
are in the record and no witnesses were called at the three hearings Casey
wants transcribed. (R., pp. 69-72, 76-79, 88.) Casey's argument is necessarily
that some argument or comment-by himself, the attorneys, or the judge-was
so influential at probation revocation proceedings held at least five months later
that a transcript of the earlier proceedings is necessary to review for an abuse of
the district court's discretion. This argument is, at best, speculative. The current
record is more than adequate for appellate review of claims that the district court
abused its discretion by revoking probation or executing the reduced sentence.
The requested transcripts are not necessary to pursue appellate claims of
abuse of discretion in revoking probation and executing a reduced sentence.
Casey's speculative claims that he cannot have a fair review of the merits without
the transcripts do not establish a violation of his Constitutional rights to due
process, equal protection, or effective assistance of counsel.

II.
Casey Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In The Court's Order Executing A
Significantly Reduced Sentence Or Denying Reconsideration
A.

Introduction
Casey argues his performance on probation demonstrated an abuse of

discretion in revoking probation despite other than the violations.

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 18-19.) He also asserts that the district court should have reduced his
7

sentence even further to avoid excess. (Appellant's brief, pp. 19-22.) Neither
claim is meritorious.

B.

Standard Of Review
"If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district

court's decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion."
State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009) (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529, 20 P.3d 709, 713 (Ct. App. 2001)).

"Sentencing

decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore, 131 Idaho
814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

Casey Has Shown No Abuse Of Discretion In Either Executing The
Sentence Or Not Reducing It Further
A trial court has discretion to revoke probation if any of the terms and

conditions of the probation have been violated. I.C. §§ 19-2603, 20-222; State v.
Beckett, 122 Idaho 324, 325, 834 P.2d 326, 327 (Ct. App. 1992); State v. Adams,
115 Idaho 1053, 1054, 772 P.2d 260, 261 (Ct. App. 1989); State v. Hass, 114
Idaho 554, 558, 758 P.2d 713, 717 (Ct. App. 1988). In determining whether to
revoke probation, a court must examine whether the probation is achieving the
goal of rehabilitation and is consistent with the protection of society.

State v.

Upton, 127 Idaho 274, 275, 899 P.2d 984, 985 (Ct. App. 1995); Beckett, 122
Idaho at 325, 834 P.2d at 327.
Upon revoking a defendant's probation, a court may order the original
sentence executed or reduce the sentence as authorized by Idaho Criminal Rule
8

35. State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28, 218 P.3d 5, 7 (Ct. App. 2009) (citing
Beckett, 122 Idaho at 326, 834 P.2d at 328; State v. Marks, 116 Idaho 976, 977,
783 P.2d 315, 316 (Ct. App. 1989)). A court's decision not to reduce a sentence
is reviewed for an abuse of discretion subject to the well-established standards
governing whether a sentence is excessive. Hanington, 148 Idaho at 28, 218
P.3d at 7. Those standards require an appellant to "establish that, under any
reasonable view of the facts, the sentence was excessive considering the
objectives of criminal punishment." State v. Stover, 140 Idaho 927, 933, 104
P.3d 969, 975 (2005).

Those objectives are: "(1) protection of society; (2)

deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrong doing." State v. Wolfe,
99 Idaho 382, 384, 582, P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The reviewing court "will examine
the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment,"
i.e., "facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as events occurring
between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." Hanington,
148 Idaho at 29, 218 P.3d at 8.
Casey has a prior felony conviction for delivery of a controlled substance
and this is his fourth felony DUI conviction.

(PSI, pp. 12-15. 3)

He has

misdemeanor DUI convictions from 1988, 1989, 1995, and 1998. (PSI, pp. 1314.) A former probation officer stated that although Casey "did okay while he
was on probation," none of the efforts to treat his alcohol abuse "had a lasting

Page references are to the electronic exhibit including the PSI and other
sentencing documents.
3
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effect." (PSI, p. 17.) More extensive attempts to treat his alcohol abuse failed
because Casey kept getting kicked out of long-term programs. (PSI, pp. 18-19,
29.)

The substance abuse evaluation prepared for sentencing in 2010

recommended "an ASAM level 111.5 residential treatment program." (PSI, p. 10.)
Casey completed the CAPP program on his rider before being granted probation.
(PSI, pp. 46-47.) Casey was granted probation in May 2011 (R., p. 89) and was
using alcohol and controlled substances again by October that same year {R., p.
93).
In deciding to revoke probation the district court referenced Casey's "five
felony convictions and eight convictions for driving under the influence" (12/13/11
Tr., p. 34, Ls. 18-22), and found "Casey's history on probation supervision" to be
"replete" with probation violations and concerns (12/13/11 Tr., p. 34, L. 23 - p. 35,
L. 3). The district court concluded the community was not protected by probation

because Casey was "back consuming alcohol" and his lengthy record showed
that "[s]ooner or later" he would "get behind the wheel" and "kill somebody and
society is going to be suffering as a consequence of the Court's repeated
extension of opportunities." (12/13/11 Tr., p. 35, L. 18 - p. 36, L. 4.) The district
court recognized there were "certainly some positive aspects" to be considered,
including there was no evidence Casey had actually driven under the influence
again and that Casey had "some measure of acknowledgement that he has
violated his probation." (12/13/11 Tr., p. 36, L. 22 - p. 37, L. 6.) The positives,
however, justified only a reduction of the sentence imposed and not a return to
probation. (12/13/11 Tr., p. 37, L. 7 - p. 38, L. 24.) The district court stated in
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denying Casey's Rule 35 motion that potential mitigation in the case did not
"override the principal concerns of protection of society and trying to achieve
some major rehabilitation." (5/4/12 Tr., p. 14, Ls. 7-14.)
The district court stated its findings and reasons for its rulings. Its findings,
not challenged on appeal, support the district court's exercise of discretion.
Because the record supports the exercise of discretion employed by the district
court, Casey has failed to show error.

CONCLUSION

The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district court's
orders revoking probation and executing the reduced sentence of eight years
with one and one-half years determinate for felony DUI.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2013.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 23rd day of January, 2013, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
SHAWN F. WILKERSON
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the Idaho
Supreme Court Clerk's office.

KENNETH K. JOR
Deputy Attorney G
KKJ/pm
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